The mechanics of a reasonably fitted quarterly New Keynesian macro model by Mayer, Eric
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Mayer, Eric
Working Paper
The mechanics of a reasonably fitted
quarterly New Keynesian macro model
Würzburg economic papers, No. 41
Provided in cooperation with:
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Suggested citation: Mayer, Eric (2003) : The mechanics of a reasonably fitted quarterly New













The Mechanics of a Reasonably Fitted Quarterly New 


















Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geld 
und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg 




W. E. P. 
 
Würzburg Economic Papers   2 
 
The Mechanics of a Reasonably Fitted Quarterly New  
Keynesian Macro Model 
 
Eric Mayer 
University of Wuerzburg 
 
First Version February 2003 




Within this paper we estimate key parameters of a New Keynesian Macromodel in order to 
evaluate the mechanics of the model. Similar approaches have been taken by Castelnuovo 
(2003), Dennis (2001) and Söderlind et.al (2002). Based on matching moments  the paper 
presents evidence that hybrid specifications of New Keynesian macromodel s are characterised 
by approximately 60 percent of backward looking economic agents. The predominant goal of 
monetary policy is price stability and financial market stability. Output gap stabilisation only 
plays a minor role as an independent goal if a central bank faces a flat Phillips curve. 
 
 
Keywords: New Keynesian Macromodel, hybrid Phillips curve, hybrid IS curve, forward 
looking behaviour, rule-of-thumb behaviour. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C51, E52, E58.  
_________________ 
§ The paper greatly benefitted from presentation at Antwerp (Doctoral Seminar),  Halle (2
nd Hallescher 
Workshop), Würzburg (Economic Workshop) and Zü rich (Verein für Socialpolitik). For valuable comments I 
thank in particular Peter Bofinger (University of Würzburg), Efrem Castelnuovo (University of Bocconi), Axel 
Lindner (Halle Institute for Economic Research), Jef Plasmans (University of Antwerp and Tilburg) and Timo 
Wollermershäuser (ifo-Institute for Economic Research). 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Eric Mayer, Chair for Monetary Policy and International 
Economics, Universität Würzburg, Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg, Tel.: (+ 49 / 931) 31-
2948, Fax: (+ 49 / 931) 31-2775. 
E-mail: eric.mayer@mail.uni-wuerzburg.de  
 
   3 
 
The Mechanics of a Reasonably Fitted Quarterly New  








Within this paper we estimate key parameters of a New Keynesian Macromodel in order to 
evaluate the mechanics of the model. Similar approaches have been taken by Castelnuovo 
(2003), Dennis (2001) and Söderlind et.al (2002). Based on matching moments  the paper 
presents evidence that hybrid  specifications of  a  New Keynesian  macromodel  are 
characterised by approximately 60 percent of backward looking  economic agents. The 
predominant goal of monetary policy is price stability and financial market stability. Output 





Keywords: New Keynesian Macro Model, hybrid Phillips curve, hybrid IS curve, forward 






JEL Classification: C51, E52, E58.  
 
 
   4 
1  Introduction 
 
The last years have witnessed a sharp increase of  interest in evaluating monetary policy 
strategies (see Taylor (1999). This normative branch of monetary economics tries to evaluate 
the p erformance of alternative strategies in terms of associated monetary policy outcomes. 
The basic rationale for this approach is the insight that the central bank faces a stable choice 
menue in terms second moments of the target variables (e.g., Taylor (1979)). This exercise is 
crucially based on the assumption that key parameters of the model, in particular the degree of 
forward-lookingness in the intertemporal IS-equation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
(NKPC), as well as the preference vector of mone tary policy which trades off the different 
goal variables  are correctly specified. This paper targets at proposing a strategy that 
simultaneously identifies these key parameters by matching moments. Similar approaches 
have been taken by Castelnuovo  (2003) and Söderlind et.al (2002). We construct for each 
variable (the inflation rate, the output gap, the interest rate and the first difference of each 
variable) a separate criterion, which measures the sum of squared percentage deviations of the 
individual moments from its historical counterparts. The estimated vector of key parameters 
minimises the distance between the moments of the model and those nested in the data. As a 
toolkit to analyse the plausibility of the identified key parameters we p roceed along the 
following lines. First, we compute the impulse response functions as a cross cheque for the 
embedded transmission structure. Second, we test for stability and uniqueness along the lines 
as proposed by Blanchard et. al. (1980) by computing the regions of determinacy . Third and 
most importantly we evaluate the mechanics of the model in detail by performing a battery of 
baseline evaluations.  
The following results stand out: Approximately 60 percent of all pricing and consumption 
decisions are made by rule of thumb setters which simply centre their pricing decisions on 
heuristics. Additionally we present evidence that the dominant goal of monetary policy   5 
besides stabilizing the inflation rate is interest rate smoothing. The stabilization of the output 
gap only seems to play a minor role for the conduct of monetary policy as an independent 
goal variable.  The presence of forward looking economic agents seems to facilitate the 




 2  The Structure of New Keynesian Macro Models 
 
Standard New Keynesian Macro Models share a simple structure that is centred around three 
building blocs: 
 
•  A new Keynesian Phillips curve as inflation adjustment line. 
•  An intertemporal IS-equation describing the optimal consumption behaviour of 
households. 
•  And an optimal or simple monetary policy rule depicting the way according to which 
monetary policy is conducted . 
 
We will shortly discuss each of these building blocks in term. 
 
 
2.1 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
   6 
A cornerstone of New Keynesian  macromodels is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
(e.g., Jondeau et al, 2001, Roberts, 1995; Sbordone,1999; Woodford  1996). The NKPC curve 
relates the inflation rate to some measure of economic activity. Hence it gives a description of 
the supply side of the economy. The standard NKPC can be summarized as follows: 
 
  1 tttt y pbpge + =++ ,  (1) 
 
where b depicts the discount factor of households. Note that g is a function of the underlying 
deeper structural parameters of a New Keynesian macromodel. In particular it will depend on 
the fraction of firms that receive each period a signal to reset prices optimally (Calvo-pricing) 
and on  the assumptions made on the production technology of firms ( e.g., Walsh  (2003), 
chapter 5). In applied work it has prevailed that purely forward-looking  specification of the 
NKPC do not replicate the hump-shaped response embedded in impulse response functions  as 
documented by VAR studies (e.g., Christiano J. et al., (1998). Therefore some degree of 
backward lookingness is necessary to introduce persistence in the inflation rate. A popular 
approach to endogenize persistence was proposed by Altig et al. (2002). They introduce rule 
of thumb behaviour on some part of price setters. Hence besides Calvo-pricing some price 
setters update their prices following a rule of thumb. In particular one may assume that some 
price setters simply update their prices by yesterdays aggregate price level. Note that the 
degree of indexation may be partial (e.g., Smets et al (2003)). This rule of thumb behavior can 
be rationalized as follows (e.g., Amato et. al., (2003)): 
•  Rule of thumb behaviour does not produce any computational costs. 
•  The fraction of price setters that updates by rule of thumb implicitly learns as  1 t p -  
incor porates the pricing decisions of those agents that have optimised in period t-1.    7 
•  In steady state rule of thumb setters will set prices equal to those who do Calvo  (1983) 
pricing. 
 
Based on this notion the NKPC in its most general form at a quarterly frequency can be 
written as follows: 
 
  1 11 (1)
sn
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The current rate of inflation is explained by a weighted average of past and future inflation 
rates as well as the current and lagged variables of the output gap. No consensus has yet 
emerged up to which degree the price setting behaviour of economic agents is governed by 
forward-looking behaviour. Table 1 presents some evidence from estimated and calibrated 
‘baseline’ versions. The presented baseline estimates of the degree of forward-lookingness 
vary from 0.1 to 0.75. This dispersion in estimates is somewhat inconvenient. In section 4 we 
demonstrate that the degree of forward-lookingness critically changes the correlation structure 
of the model and hence the impact of monetary policy itself. 
 
2.2     The New Keynesian IS-Curve: Euler Equation 
 
The second building bloc of New Keynesian macromodels is the intertemporal IS-equation. It 
gives a description of the demand side of the economy. The New Keynesian IS-curve is a 
relationship that relates the output gap negatively to the expected real interest rate and to 
tomorrows output gap. The demand shock ht can be interpreted as a shock to the natural rate 
of interest or a stochastic shock to the representative households preferences. 
   8 
  [ ] 0111 ttttttt yiEEy bbph ++ =--++   (3) 
 
Unfortunately this relation like the NKP curve  is  at odds with the data as it is unable to 
display the inertia nested in aggregate output. The standard Euler-equation predicts that a 
shock to aggregate demand will generate only a single jump in output which stands in contrast 
to the hump shaped response documented in VAR studies (e.g., Christiano J. et al., (1998)). 
One remedy to this problem was offered by Fuhrer (2000). He reintroduced persistence into 
the aggregate spending relationship by introducing habit formation in the utility function of 
households. Hence households centre their optimal consumption choice around a targeted 
consumption level (‘habit stock’) which is usually expressed as a share of yesterdays personal 
(internal habit) or aggregate (external habit) consumption level .  A second approach to 
generate an inertial IS-relationship is to introduce rule of thumb consumers. Rule of thumb 
consumers simply set today’s desired consumption level equal to last periods consumption 
level. Thus, some fraction of households  z  optimises while another fraction  ( ) 1 z -  of 
households simply centres its consumption decisions around last periods consumption level. 
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The parameter  y m  is a function of the underlying deeper parameters of the model . It depends 
critically on the degree of habit formation . Table 2 presents some baseline estimates for the 
IS-curve. Reviewing these studies there seems to crystallise a consensus that a substantial   9 
degree of backward lookingness is needed to fit the actual data. At least 50 percent of the 
economic agents are assumed to be backward looking according to the reviewed studies. 
 
2.3      Specifying the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
 
The third building bloc of New Keynesian Model is a relationship depicting the way 
according to which monetary policy is conducted. The overall goal of monetary policy is to 
promote economic welfare. Given the legal mandate of most prominent central banks this is 
usually interpreted in terms of keeping the inflation rate close to the inflation target while 
equally stabilizing the output gap around its potential. As it is our aim to take the model to the 
data we additionally introduce interest rate smoothing as an independent goal of monetary 
policy
1. It is an observable fact that monetary policy is implemented gradually. Typically 
short-term rates are not changed by more but 25 or 50 basis points. In other words monetary 
authorities do not implement their desired interest rate target cold turkey but perform a 
gradual adjustment to the desired target level. This observable interest rate setting behaviour 
can be rationalized among others by the following argument: Policymaker’s are confronted 
with three major types of uncertainties. Model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and data 
uncertainty. It is well documented that each of these uncertainties tends to reduce the 
aggressiveness with which policymakers react with their instrument to the set of 
predetermined variables. In other words the coefficients in the optimal monetary policy rules 
are smaller in absolute values. This automatically translates into a smoother interest rate 
setting behaviour. One straightforward way to introduce interest rate smoothing in the model 
is to put a higher weight on interest rate smoothing in the loss function ( e.g., Martin et al., 
                                                   
1 Note we will not consider interest rate smoothing around a long run nominal equilibrium rate as alternative 
goal of monetary policy. As noted by Woodford (2002) this notion of smoothing might be rationalized by a 
desire to avoid the zero lower bound, hence a deflationary trap.   10 
1999). Given these goals of monetary policy we can state the loss function as follows (e.g., 
Svensson, 2003): 
 
  ( )
2 2 2




ºß ￿   (5) 
 
There are only a few studies available that try to pin down the preferences  ( ) 1;; ln  of 
monetary policy makers for the US. Reviewing these studies (Table 3) there seems to emerge 
the following consensus: Central banks seem to put a higher weight on stabilizing the 
inflation rate around the inflation target than stabilizing output at its capacity level. 
Additionally a high weight is put on interest rate smoothing. Output stabilization only seems 
to play a minor role for the conduct of monetary policy. An analytical explanation for this 
finding was given by Woodford (2003, chapter 6). Based on  a second order approximation of 
a representative households utility function around  the steady state he concluded that the 
driving result behind small values for l is a flat Phillips curve. If monetary policy puts a high 
weight on inflation it needs to induce substantial changes in the output gap in order  to control 
the inflation rate. Accordingly it is logically impossible to put a high weight on inflation and 
output stabilisation simultaneously.  
 
 
3  Rewriting the Model in State Space Form 
 
A convenient representation of the New Keynesian  macromodel  can be given by the 
following set of difference equations: 
 
  11 tttt XAXBiv ++ =++  (6)   11 
 
Xt is the state vector, which defines each period the state space. The matrix A captures the 
structural or reduced form coefficients of the economy. B is a vector consisting of the interest 
rate impact multipliers. The shocks that drive the system are stacked into v t. Due to the 
specific model set up the variance covariance matrix W is diagonal. Therefore we interpret the 
individual shocks as structural shocks. As some of our variables will not be predetermined we 

















  (7) 
n1 Predetermined variables: X1t  
n2 Forward-Looking Variables: X2t 
 
At the start of period t X 1t, driven by the shock terms  t e  is realized. Then the central bank, 
conditional on the available information set  ( ) 1111 ,,,,,... tttt t XXi ee ---  chooses  t i . At the end of 
period t X 2t results. Finally rational expectations on  21 tt EX +  are formed on the available 
information at the end of period t. Assume for the moment t hat we can represent the 
instrument of monetary policy as a linear function of the state variables. 
 
  tt rFX =-   (8) 
 
Given our system we can then evaluate the closed loop dynamics (the economy in conjunction 
with the policy rule) if we insert  tt rFX =  in the dynamic law of motion: 
 
                                                   
2 For an in depth discussion of state space systems containing forward looking variables see Söderlind (1999), 
Svensson (1999).   12 
  11 () ttt XABFXv ++ =-+   (9) 
 
Hence we arrive at the following modified system:  
 
  11 ttt XMXv ++ =+  With  () MABF =-   (10) 
 
Equation  (10) gives a complete description of the closed loop dynamics. Therefore it 
represents our basic equation when analysing the properties of monetary policy rules. The 
variance of the state vector is given by the expression: 
 
  [ ]
1 ()() XX vecIMMvec
- S=-˜W   (11) 
 
The second equation, which completes the description of our state space system, is the so -
called measurement equation. It can be stated as follows: 
 
  tXti YCXCF =+   (12) 
 
The measurement equation defines the vector of variables as a function of the state variables 
and the specified monetary policy rule. If we partition CX in two blocs associated with the 
backward and forward looking state variables we arrive at the following equation: 
 
  ( ) 12 tXXtit YCCXCi =++ ,  (13) 
 
which can equally be expressed only in terms of predetermined variables: 
   13 
  ( ) 121 tXXit YCCCCFX =++   (14) 
 








4  Calibrating the Model 
 
In the following section we will propose a calibration scheme that simultaneously calibrates 
the degree of forward -lookingness in the Phillips curve and the IS-curve as well as the 
preference vector of monetary policy. For the remaining parameters we use estimates as 
provided by Rudebusch  (2000). Compared to related literature (See Castelnuovo  (2003), 
Söderlind et. al.  (2002)) we do not rely on simulation techniques but on a n analytically 
constructed variance-covariance matrix which allows us to compute diverse moments. The 
estimation relies on minimising t he distance between empirically observed moments and 
those generated by the model. 
 
4.1 Calibration Method 
 
Let us make (as untested apriority) the assumption that a New Keynesian Macro Model 
describes the true data generating process at a quarterly frequency. Taking this apriority we   14 
calibrate the model in order to meet simultaneously a set of well-defined criteria. We calibrate 
simultaneously the vector  ;;;; yr p ymmmln Øø = ºß  with: 
•  p m  the degree of forward lookingness in the Phillips curve. 
•  y m  the degree of forward lookingness in the IS-curve. 
•  r m  the degree of forward lookingness with respect to real interest rates in the IS-curve. 
•  l  weight monetary policy puts on output stabilization relative to stabilizing the inflation 
rate. 
•  u weight the central bank puts on interest rate smoothing relative to inflation rate 
stabilization. 
Let us in particular define the following measuremen t vector. 
 
[ ] 12311231212 ttttttttttttttttttt Yyyiiiiiiiy pppppppp ----------- =DDDDDDD  
 
with variance covariance matrix as defined by equation  (15). The calibration technique 
proceeds along the following lines: 
 
We iterate the individual parameters over the following ranges: 
•  p m  in the interval from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. 
•  y m  from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. 
•  r m  was set alternatively equal to null or one. 
•  l  in the interval from 0 to 4 with step size 0.05. 
•  u in the interval from 0 to 6 with step size 0.1.   15 
For each preference vector  1,,,,, yr p ylnmmm Øø = ºß  we simultaneously compute the implied 
variances, covariances and autocorrelations of the measured variables. In the next step we 
compute the following criterion: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
' ˆˆ W qyqqyq --   (16) 
Where  q  is a vector consisting of the chosen criteria. For a detailed definition of the 
individual criteria see Appendix 4. Each individual element of each criterion consists of the 
absolute squared percentage difference between the individual variances, covariances, and 
auto correlations of each variable (the inflation rate, the output gap, the interest rate and the 
respective differences) implied by  1 yr p ylnmmm Øø = ºß  minus the corresponding 
empirically observed values in the historical data (1987:4-2002:2). This sample period covers 
the term of the chairman Alan Greenspan. As weightening matrix W we use the identity 
matrix. Accordingly W is specified as: 
  6,6 WI =   (17) 
Among this the set of 960.000 parameter constellations we choose to identify those ten 
combinations y  that minimize the following criteria:  
 









  (18) 
 
As can be seen from equation (18) we additionally impose the restriction that the individual 
standard deviations of the goal variables should not display a greater percentage deviation but 
c from historical counterparts. Hence we implicitly give a dominant role to the individual 
variances of the time series while calibrating the model. We set c=0.5.  
   16 
4.2  Calibrating the Remaining Parameters 
 
The backward looking inflation polynomial in the Phillips curve  i p a , the impact of economic 
activity on inflation  y a , the interest rate sensitivity of economic activity in the IS-curve  r b , 
and the autoregressive part in the output gap equation  yi b  was specified by estimates as 
reported by  Rudebusch  (2000) which are displayed in Table 4. Rudebusch  (2000) used the 
following specifications:  t p  was specified as the quarterly inflation rate in the GDP chain-
weighted price index  t p  seasonally adjusted and calculated at an annual rate  ( ) 1 4lnln tt PP - - ; 
t p  is the four quarter moving average constructed as  ( )
3
0 14 tj i p - = ￿ ;  t i  is the four quarter 
average federal funds rate, hence 
3 1
4 0 tj i i - = ￿ ; yt is the output gap constructed as the percentage 
deviation of the output Yt from trend output 
*
t Y , where 
*
t Y  was taken from the Congretional 
Budget Office. All variables were demeaned prior to estimation. Note in particular that the 
specification as proposed by  Rudebusch  (2000) implies that the sum over the inflation 
polynomial (
4
1 1 i i p b
= = ￿ ) is equal to one, so that the long run neutrality of money holds. This 
means in steady state ( 123 ...
TTTT
tttt ppppp --- =====.) it holds that: 
 





=   (19) 
 
Obviously the property of long run neutrality is violated as long as 
[ ] 1234 1 pppp bbbbb +++=„ . Higher inflation targets 
T p  could boost output permanently,   17 
which would violate the long run neutrality of money
3. Thus, it is desirable to set the slope 






= . This is from an economic point 
of view somewhat problematic as  b  should be interpreted as a discount factor. 
 
 
5  Calibration Results: An Evaluation of the Proposed Baseline
  Calibration4 
 
In the following section we will present and evaluate the outcomes of the proposed evaluation 
method. The proposed toolkit to analyse the identified baseline specification proceeds along 
the following lines. In a first step we will analyse the basic plausibility of the identified 
baseline calibration by computing the impulse response patterns following a supply, demand 
and interest rate shock. The impulse response analysis serves as a cross cheque for the implied 
correlation structure embedded  in our preferred calibration vector 
1 yr p ylnmmm Øø = ºß . As a second crude tool we will evaluate the stability and the 
uniqueness properties by testing whether the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to the 
number of forward looking variables as proposed by Blanchard et al. (1980). Additionally we 
will compute regions of determinacy. Following these preliminary examinations we will 
systematically analyse the mechanics of the model by a battery of baseline evaluations. 
 
 
                                                   
3 Note that standard New Keynesian Macro-Models typically exhibit a modest degree of non-neutrality as b has 
the economic interpretation of households discount factor. 
4 All codes for basic computations were taken from Paul Söderlind homepage: 
http://www.hhs.se/personal/PSoderlind/Research/MonEEAMatLab.zip   18 
5.1 Top Ranked Calibration Vectors: Uniqueness and Stability 
 
The top ranked vector combinations y  identified by the proposed calibration method are 
displayed in Table 5. Following Blanchard et al (1980) we test for uniqueness and stability by 
computing the eigenvalues. It has to hold that the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to 
the number of forward-looking variables. A look at the partitioned state vector tells us that the 
number of predetermined variables is equal to nine. The number of forward -looking variables 
is equal to four: 
•  { }
'
11231123 ,,,,,,,, tttttttttt Xyyiii pppp ------- =  
•  { }
'
23211 ,,, ttttttttt XEEEEy ppp ++++ =  
Table 6 confirms that for  [ ] 10 10.151.850.40.41 y =  the number of forward-looking 
variables satisfies the proposition as stated by Blanchard et al. (1980). Hence we conclude 
that the identified baseline configuration  10 y  generates a stable and unique solution. We have 
equally tested for stability and uniqueness for the combinations  19 y - . All identified vectors 
were stable, but not unique.  In other words the number o f stable eigenvalues was larger than 
the  nu mber of predetermined variables.  
Figure 1 shows how determinacy is affected for the baseline calibration as we alter the 
degrees of aggressiveness with which monetary policy reacts to deviations from the inflation 
and output target. Figure 1 impressively illustrates that as soon  as monetary policy puts price 
stability in its main focus determinacy is assured in the quarterly setting. Nevertheless in the 
case where monetary policy neglects its legal mandate to safeguard stable prices, hence if 
0 f =  the model becomes indeterminate.  Additionally  combinations of high degrees of 
forward-lookingness in price setting and high degrees of forward-lookingnes in consumption   19 
decisions  induce  indeterminacy, whereas a higher degree of price stickiness builds in ‘path-
dependency’ that generates determinacy. 
The  estimated vector combination  [ ] 10 10.151.850.40.41 y =  is described by the 
following characteristics: 
•  The weight l  of stabilising squared deviations of the output gap around zero is rather 
small compared to the weight put on the other two goal variables of monetary policy. 
It is well known that this does not mean that monetary policy does not care on the 
output gap. This is quickly confirmed if one takes a look at the optimal monetary 
policy rule which is given by:  
 
  12311 0.29470.11400.11690.01660.23480.07010.6391 tttttttt iyyi pppp ----- =++++++  (20) 
 
•  Monetary policy reacts on impact with an increase of 0.2348 to current changes in the 
output gap and with a coefficient of 0.0701 to changes in last periods output gap. This 
can be explained as follows: Even a central bank that only puts a modest weight  on 
output stabilisation opts to react on movements in economic activity in order not to 
loose control over the inflation rate as the output gap is the driving variable of the 
inflation process (e.g., Svensson, 2003). The finding that output gap  stabilisation only 
seems to be of minor importance as an independent goal of monetary policy is well in 
line with related studies that coherently come to the same result. 
•  The relatively high weight on financial market stability as an independent goal of 
monetary policy confirms earlier results by Dennis (2001) and Söderlind et al. (2002). 
The high weight on interest rate smoothing is reflected in the optimal discretionary 
monetary policy rule as the coefficient on it-1 is equal to 0.6391.   20 
•  The degree of forward-lookingness in the Phillips curve is identified to be equal to 0.4. 
Hence 40 percent of economic agents seem to build rational expectations on the 
inflation rate whereas 60 percent set their prices based on rule of thumbs. This result 
lies in the midst of the estimates presented by related studies. Accordingly the 
calibration results give further evidence that purely forward-looking Phillips curves do 
not fit the facts. 
•  The degree of forward lookingness in the IS equation is identified to be equal to 0.4. 
Hence only a modest degree of forward lookingness seems to be present in the data, 
which confirms earlier results by  Fuhrer (2000)5. In other words a purely forward 
looking IS-equation is not able to describe the optimal consumption plan of 
households. Consumption decisions seem to be mainly driven by rule-of-thumb 
behaviour and habit formation. Households centre their current and future spending 
decisions around yesterdays consumption level or alternatively around some targeted 
level of consumption. 
As Table   7 indicates the identified vector  10 [10.151.850.40.41] y =  captures the 
correct signs of the autocorrelation functions over all relevant variables. Nevertheless the 
model has some problems in displaying the low variance in the inflation rate and  the low 
variance in the first difference of the output gap. 
 
5.2  Impulse Response Functions 
 
The main characteristics of our identified baseline configuration are depicted in Figure 2. The 
high degree of interest rate smoothing and the lags in the hybrid Phillips-curve and the IS-
equation translate into hump shaped impulse response functions that can be considered in line 
                                                   
5 Linde (2002) comes to the same conclusion: “I have not been able to find any estimates of  f b  [degree of 
forward looking ness, the author] and  b b  [degree of backward lookingness, the author], but the results in the 
literature Fuhrer (2000) suggests that  f b  is consistently less that one and that  b b  is positive”.   21 
with conventional New Keynesian Macro Models (e.g., Walsh (2003), chapter 11). We will 
shortly discuss each impulse response function in term. 
Quite remarkably the impulse response function of the inflation rate with respect to an interest 
rate shock does not exhibit a prize puzzle Figure  2(b). Following an interest rate shock the 
impulse response function of the interest rate starts to decline and reaches its peak response 
after three quarters. Due to the drop in economic activity the inflation rate equally starts to 
decline and reaches its peak response with a lag of six quarters. After approximately 20 
periods all series are back at their baseline values. Hence long run neutrality holds. The 
impulse response functions nicely depict the transmission structure encapsulated within this 
particular specification of a New Keynesian Macro Model. The peak response in the output 
gap leads the peak response in the inflation rate which can be explained by the backward -
looking inflation dynamics in the hybrid Phillips curve. This reflects that the output gap is the 
driving variable of the inflation process within a hybrid specification and that monetary policy 
can only disinflate by deeds. Given the identified parameter constellation  y  monetary policy 
largely accommodates supply shocks (see Figure 2(a)). T he initial unit supply shock leads to a 
pronounced  but modest increase in the interest rate , which goes hand in hand with a drop in 
the output gap induced by a tighter stance in monetary policy (peak response after 3 quarters). 
Consequently the inflation rate starts to decline and returns to its baseline after 13 quarters. 
The output gap exhibits a pronounced reaction, which reaches its peak response after 6 
quarters. Following a positive unit demand shock (see Figure 2(b)), monetary policy reacts by 
raising real interest rates (peak response after 3 quarters). Due to the stronger economic 
activity the inflation rate equally starts to rise. It reaches its peak response after 3 quarters. All 
depicted time series return to the ir baseline values a fter 13 quarters. This somewhat 
pronounced response compared to a supply shock reflects that monetary policy only puts a 
modest weight on output gap stabilization ( 0.15 l = ). 
   22 
 
5.3  Baseline Evaluation: Robustness of the Identified Solution 
 
In the following section we will perform a battery of baseline evaluations to get a deeper 
understanding on the mechanics of the model. In particular we will take a look at the 
sensitivity of the variances, covariances and the implied autocorrelations and cross 
correlations with respect to changes in the individual elements of the identified vector 
1 yr p ylnmmm Øø = ºß .  Figure  3 shows how the  variances o f the  goal variables 
respond ceteris paribus to a change in the individual elements of y . The results are largely in 
line with expectations. An increasing weight on the individual goal variables, hence the 
inflation rate, the output gap and the change in interest rate s respectively lead to a drop in the 
variances of each of these variables. E.g. if monetary policy puts an increasing weight on 
interest rate smoothing (increasing n ) the variance of the interest rate starts to decline. The 
same holds true for the other target variables of monetary policy. But of course reducing the 
variance of one goal variable is no free lunch. Let us assume that monetary policy puts a 
higher weight on stabilizing the inflation rate (increasing f). As side effect the va riance of the 
interest rate increases. In other words the central bank needs to make a more rigorous use of 
its instrument in response to supply and demand shocks. This is in particular obvious if we 
take a look at Figure 3(b).  Figure 3(b) depicts what happens ceteris paribus if monetary 
policy has a greater concern for economic activity. As we see the variance of the output gap 
drops with an increasing l. Nevertheless this can only be realized at the cost of an increase in 
the variance of the inflation rate. This means in particular that central banker’s take a less 
vigorous stance on supply shocks thereby increasing the fluctuations in inflation. With respect 
to the degree of forward lookingness the following seems to hold true. An increasing degree 
of forward lookingness in the hybrid Phillips curve  p m  and in the intertemporal  IS-curve  y m    23 
result in a sharp drop of the variance of the interest rate. Hence if we keep the preference 
vector corresponding to the period loss function 
222 0.151.85 tttt Lyi p =++D  fixed an 
increasing degree of forward-lookingness serves as a substitute for a more aggressive 
monetary policy stance.  Therefore one might say that an increasing degree of forward 
lookingness implies that monetary policy does not need to “lean against strong persistence” in 
the data.  
Hence the results presented by purely backward looking models stating t hat estimated 
response coefficients in monetary policy rules are smaller than optimal coefficients retrieved 
by control methods my be spurious. In the light of the results these studies might simply 
neglect the degree of forward-lookingness  0.4 y p mm == present in the data6. 
Figure 3 evaluates the impact of changes in the identified vector  1 y p ylnmm Øø = ºß  on 
the autocorrelation patterns of the inflation rate. As one would expect an increasing weight on 
stabilizing the inflation rate around the inflation target leads to a drop in the persistence of the 
inflation process (see Figure 3(a)). In other words if monetary policy uses its instrument more 
rigorously to keep the inflation rate close to the inflation target the degree of persistence in the 
inflation process declines. This underlines that the degree of persistence is endogenous to the 
monetary policy regime. Nevertheless the ‘beneficial’ reduction of persistence in one variable 
comes at a cost. E.g., an increasing weight on stabilising the output gap leads to an increase in 
the persistence of the inflation process. One likely explanation can be given as follows: As 
monetary policy tends to react stronger to movements in the output gap it will  tend to 
‘overlook’ supply shocks leading to a higher degree of persistence in the inflation rate. An 
increasing weight on  stabilising the change in interest rates leads to an increase in the inflation 
persistence, which can be quite naturally explained by  the fact that monetary policy uses its 
instrument less vigorously to keep the inflation rate on track. As expected an increasing 
                                                   
6 Influential backward looking models are for instance Ball (1997) or Rudebusch et al (1999).   24 
degree of forward lookingness leads to a drop in the degree of persistence of the inflation rate, 
as shocks are more self-stabilising if monetary policy is conducted according to a stable and 
unique policy rule, as some price setters that are called upon to reset their prices optimally 
anticipate future monetary policy decisions. Note that in the limit with  p m  converging to one, 
when we approximate the purely  forward  looking NKPC the inflation process converges 
towards white noise. 
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the autocorrelations of the interest rate with respect to the 
individual elements in  y . Increasing weights on interest rate stabilization raises the 
persistence in interest rates as monetary policy uses its instrument more cautious and gradual 
(Figure 4(c)). Hence the interest rate reaction in response to shocks will be more sustained. 
This automatically leads to a higher degree of persistence. Varying weights on stabilizing the 
output gap do not have a significant impact on the autocorrelation structure (Figure 4(b)).  
Figure  5 depicts some cross correlations inherently nested in the chosen baseline calibration 
y . Figure 5 depicts the cross correlation of the inflation rate  t p  with the lagged differences of 
the interest rate  1 , tt ii - DD  and  2 t i - D . An increasing degree of forward lookingness in the IS-
curve strengthens the correlation between past changes in the interest rate and today’s 
inflation rate. This result can be interpreted as a faster ‘path-through’ effect running from 
interest rates to the inflation rate. Figure 5(b) depicts the cross correlation between the current 
output gap  t y  and past changes in the interest rate  1 , tt ii - DD  and  2 t i - D . It can be seen that an 
increasing degree of forward lookingness in the IS-curve weakens the link between changes in 
yesterdays interest rate and changes in  the output gap. This reflects that relatively modest 
movements in the change of interest rates are sufficient to control the output gap. Interestingly 
for values of  y m  larger than 0 .5 the crosscorrelations  1 (,) tt Corryi - D  and  2 (,) tt Corryi - D  
become negative which seems to be at odds with both, intuition and the data. Hence given the 
preference vector  10.151.850.40.4 y ym Øø = ºß  there is a restriction on the set of   25 
reasonable parameter constellations  y m . Values larger than approximately 0.6 do not seem to 
be realistic. Figure  5(d) depicts the cross correlations between the interest rate  t i  and the 
output gap  t y  and  1 t y - . The identified preference vector puts again restrictions on the set of 
reasonable parameter constellations. The model needs at least 40% of economic agents that 
are forward looking.  
An increasing degree of forward lookingness in the Phillips curve tightens the link between 
interest rate changes and past movements of the output gap. Past movements in the output gap 
are faster transmitted into changes in the interest rate. Figure 5(e) reflects that an  increasing 
weight on interest rate smoothing leads to a modest increase in cross correlations of the 
interest rate with past movements in the output gap.  Figure  5(f) shows that an increasing 
weight on stabilizing the inflation rate around the inflation target loosens the link between 
lagged inflation rates and the current interest rate  (;) tti Corip - . Hence, an  increasing degree of 
aggressiveness with which monetary policy reacts on inflation breaks the persistence in the 
inflation process which automatically weakens the link between past changes in the inflation 
rate and the current use of the interest rate. 
 
 
6  Concluding Remarks 
 
It has become standardized practice to evaluate the performance of alternative simple and 
optimal monetary policy rules based on the associated monetary policy outcomes. We take the 
point of view that this exercise necessarily rests on the apriority that key parameters of the 
New Keynesian m acromodel are correctly specified. Within this paper  we proposed a 
calibration technique that is based on matching variances and autocorrelations. Based on this 
technique we present evidence that around 60 percent of the pricing and consumption   26 
decisions are not made by optimising agents but by rule of thumb setters. This result is in line 
with earlier studies and underlines that purely forward-looking NKPC and intertemporal IS-
equations are unable to match the persistence present in the data. The finding that a majority 
of households and firms do not seem to optimise but base their decisions on heuristics may be 
a fruitful area for future research as it sheds doubt on the notion of rational expectations. 
The paper made the point that some ‘conventional wisdom’ stating that estimated coefficients 
in the instrument rule of monetary policy are smaller than those retrieved by means of optimal 
control may be spurious. The analysis of the level of variances present in the data as well as 
the evaluation of selected cross correlations clearly indicates that some degree of fo rward 
lookingness is necessary to fit the facts. If monetary policy opts for a stable and unique rule, 
the job of monetary policy makers is much easier at it would be in a purely backward looking 
system, due to the implied self-stabilizing properties of forward-looking systems grounded on 
peoples expectations on stabilizing monetary policy itself (self-fulfilling expectations). The 
evaluation of some selected crosscorrelations served as a useful benchmark to put restrictions 
on the degree of forward -lookingness in the hybrid Phillips curve and the  intertemporal IS-
equation. The identified preference vector of monetary policy indicates that the dominant goal 
of monetary policy is the stabilization of the inflation rate around the inflation target. Output 
gap  stabilization as an independent goal of monetary policy only seems to play a minor role 
for the conduct of monetary policy.   27 
Appendix 1 
The General Model Setup 
 
Closely following Söderlind et al (2002) we can rewrite our basic equation in state space form 
as follows. In a first step we lead our model one period ahead and solve for the rational 
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Where  1t X  is a  91 ·  vector of predetermined state va riables  2t X is a 41 ·  vector of forward 
looking variables and  1t n  is a vector of shocks. Following Söderlind et al. (2002) we have 
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Appendix 2 
The Linear Quadratic Control Problem 
 















￿￿ ￿       















       
 























- =  and 
1
01 BAB









---- S==          
 
 
Consequently it holds that the variance-covariance matrix stays a diagonal matrix with the 
following diagonal elements:  { }
22 0000000 diag eh ss  
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The value function has to satisfy in each period the following Bellman equation: 
 





VXXQXiRiVX b + =++          
 
A cornerstone assumption in order to solve the model is to postulate a (linear) way according 
to which expectations are formed. We make the fundamental assumption that expectations are 
built as follows: 
 
2,111,1 ttttt EXCEX +++ =           
 
As every distinct policy rule is linked to a different C matrix the approach takes care of the 
well-known Lucas critique. The  policy maker cannot take expectations as given when 
changing the policy rule. With this assumption at hand one can arrive at a value function, 
which is only expressed in terms of predetermined variables: 
 
'*'*
111 ()() tttttttt VtXQXrRrEV b + =++          
 
Taking the F.O.C we arrive again at expressions for the optimal feedback rule as well as for 
the Ricatti-matrix V. Nevertheless contrasting the backward looking case our solution 
algorithm is quite different, as we do not only lack the matrix V but also the matrix C. 
Therefore the algorithm functions as follows. With an initial guess for V0 and C0 at hand we 
can iterate on the respective matrix equation until some matrix norm  1 tt CCe + -<  and 
1 tt VV e + -<  has converged. 
 
The (converged) time invariant solution can be written as:   31 
 
TIME INVARIANT SOLUTIONS IN THE BACKWARD LOOKING MODEL 




















The solution nicely depicts the expectational feedback, as the variable C does not only 
determine the forward looking variables X 2t but also influences the predetermined variables 
X1t. 
   32 
Appendix 3 
Defining the Measurement Equation 
 
Let us define a vector Yt  of measurement variables in which the monetary policy maker is 
interested in. We assume that the goal variables are given by: 
 
[ ] 12311231212 tttttttttttttttttt Yyyiiiiiiiy pppppppp ----------- =DDDDDDD    (A.1) 
 
We can define the target variables as a function of the state variables and the interest rate. 
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X218x4 C0 =                    (A.4) 
 
[ ] 000000010001000000' i C =     (A.5)   34 
Appendix 4 




































































































Criterion 5:  [ ]
2























We have proposed an equal weightening of all constructed six criteria. 
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Table 1 : Hybrid: Phillips Curves 
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Table 2: Hybrid IS-Equations 
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Table 3:Loss Functions 
Study  Identified Loss Function  Period  Method 
Castelnuovo 
(2003) 
222 0.50.5 t Lyi p =++D  
1987-2001  Calibration based 
on a distance 
criterion 
Söderlind et al. 
(2002) 
222 0.11.5 t Lyi p =++D  
1987-1999  Calibration, based 
on matching 
moments  
       
Dennis (2001)  222 0.2312.3 t Lyi p =++D   1979-2000  FIML 
Favero and 
Rovelli (2002) 
222 0.001250.0085 t Lyi p =++D  




22 0.25 t Ly p =+  
1987-1999  Slope of the 
Aggregate Supply 
Relationship 
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Table 4: Calibrating the New Keynesian Model  
Quarterly New Keynesian Model 
(Rudebusch 2000) 
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Table 5: Calibration Output 
RANKING    l  n  mp  m y 
           
1    0.05  1.65  0.6  0.2 
2    0  1.65  0.6  0.2 
3    0  1.55  0.6  0.2 
4    0  1.45  0.6  0.2 
5    0  1.35  0.6  0.2 
6    0  1.25  0.6  0.2 
7    0  1.15  0.6  0.2 
8    0  1.05  0.6  0.2 
9    0  0.95  0.6  0.2 
10    0.15  1.85  0.4  0.4 
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Table 6: Stability and Uniqueness of the Identified Solution 
Eigenvalues  Stability  
0  Stable 
0  Stable 
3.97  Unstable 
-1.27 + 1.67i  Unstable 
-1.27 - 1.67i  Unstable 
-0.122 + 0.53i  Stable 
-0.122 - 0.53i  Stable 
-0.157  Stable 
1.05  Unstable 
0.80 + 0.30i  Stable 
0.80 - 0.31i  Stable 
0.61  Stable 
0.34  Stable 
For the identified baseline calibration:  [ ] 10.151.850.40.41 y = . 
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Table  7 Time Series Properties: Simulated and Actual Data: (1987:4-2002:1) 
LEVELS    ONE-QUATER-CHANGES 
RANK 
i y   STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1)  AC(2)  AC(3)   
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1)  AC(2)  AC(3) 
  Inflation 
Data  0.9794  0.649  0.514  0.585    0.8105  -0.32  -0.283  0.101 
1  1.4678  0.6325  0.4487  0.4069    1.2584  -0.2501  -0.193   
2  1.4688  0.632  0.4473  0.4042    1.2601  -0.2491  -0.1924   
3  1.4588  0.627  0.4406  0.3983    1.26  -0.2502  -0.1931   
4  1.4485  0.6217  0.4336  0.3921    1.2599  -0.2513  -0.1939   
5  1.4377  0.6161  0.4261  0.3856    1.2598  -0.2525  -0.1947   
10  1.4668  0.67328  0.49702  0.49383    1.1857  -0.23026  -0.2649   
  Output Gap 
Data  1.6953  0.945  0.865  0.755    0.5462  0.28  0.278  0.049 
1  1.6026  0.8256        0.9464       
2  1.613  0.8278        0.9467       
3  1.6085  0.8265        0.9475       
4  1.6038  0.8252        0.9484       
5  1.5988  0.8237        0.9493       
10  1.4906  0.78226        0.98367       
                   
  Fed eral Funds Rate 
Data  1.9326  0.930  0.814  0.671    0.5365  0.58  0.303  0.191 
1  1.7351  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.6093  0.6042  0.2837   
2  1.7262  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.5999  0.6136  0.296   
3  1.7332  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.6075  0.6109  0.2916   
4  1.7411  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.6159  0.608  0.2869   
5  1.7501  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.6253  0.6049  0.2818   
10  1.5113  0.58  0.303  0.191    0.4626  0.5873  0.2810     48 
Figure 1 Regions of Determinancy 
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Figure 2 Impulse Response Function of the Baseline Configuration 
(a) 
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Figure 3: Variances with changing  [] y p yflnmm = * 
*setting  1 r m =  dominated setting  0 r m = in terms of the chosen criterion, therefore we kept  1 r m =  for all possible specifications. 
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Figure 4: Autocorrelations of inflation with changing   [] y p yflnmm = * 
(a) 








































































*setting  1 r m =  dominated setting  0 r m = in terms of the chosen criterion, therefore we kept  1 r m =  for all possible specifications.   52 
Figure 5: Autocorrelations of the interest rate  [] y p yflnmm = * 
(a) 







































































*setting  1 r m =  dominated setting  0 r m = in terms of the chosen criterion, therefore we kept  1 r m =  for all possible specifications.   53 
Figure 6: Selected Cross correlations with changing  [] y p yflnmm =  
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